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The United States' Savings and Loan Bail Out Effort:
A Discussion and Critique

Th omas Gifford

•
During its 160 year history, the savings and loan industr y has h ad its share of
turmoil , but no previous situation rivals the events of the 1980s. During this
period 525 insolvent S&Ls ( or thrifts) were liquidated or sold . The cost was so
e normous that in 1989, President Bush announced that taxpayers would have
to bear the burden of the bailout at the expense of much needed education ,
welfare, and infrastructure improvement programs. The situation was so financially complex that few taxpayers truly understood what had occurred.
This essay will e xamine the savings and loan disaste r. The intent is to provide a detailed, yet generalized, view of the history of savings and loans leading
up to and through the crisis.
HISTORY OF SAVINGS AND L OANS

Economic environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Prior to 1970, the savings
and loan industry was a solid, mature, and relatively unexciting industry. Stri ct
regula tions from the depression era and a lack of competitors created a strong
niche for S&Ls . As inflation went out of control in the 1970s, however, credi t
shortages became common. Such shortage s, as well as new methods for d epositing savings and creating credit, placed the regulatory structure pertaining
to depository institutions in general, and savings and loans in particular, un der attack (Eichle r 1989, p . 15). The e conomic conditions of th e late 1970s
would help to signal the end of an era for savings and loans.
A major contributor was disintermedi a tion. Historically, people h ave invested th e ir money in banks and savings and loans, and the institutions, in tu r n ,
have invested that mone y in sec uritie s. In the late 19 70 s, Regul atio n

Q, a

ce iling place d on deposit inte r es t r ate s, ca u se d S&L inte re st r ate s to be far
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below those offered in other areas of th e market: securities, money m arket
funds, e tc . (Hutchinson 1984, p . 42). Savers began to look e lsew h e r e for
greater re turns. They invested directly in securities with higher yie lds a nd b ypassed the S&Ls. T his is kn own as dis interme diation . As a resu lt , savings and
Joans began to lac k funds .
Thrifts' o pe ratin g costs rose as a share of asse ts because expenses were rising at an in creasing rate (Barth 1991 , pp. 21-22). Indee d , ex penses were
increasing fas ter t h a n revenues , which d ec r eased S&L profits . Savings and
Loans also began ex perien cing a maturity mismatc h between liabilities and
asse ts . Th rift assets were usually long-te rm and included mostl y 30-year fixedrate home loans at very low interest rates . The ir liabilities, on the other hand ,
were short-te rm passbook accounts subje c t to immediate withdrawal. This
meant that funds were coming into savings and loa ns much more slowly than
they were going out, causing a shortage . The fixed-rate h o me loans also locked
S&L funds into preset low intere st levels with no chance for refinancing . As
noted earlier, the late 1970s and early 1980s also were years of high inflation
an d interest rates, both of which were over 12 percent (Eichler 1989, p. 44). In
real terms, savings and loans we re barely getting e nough of a return to cove r
inflation . The se factors all contributed to the low yields on thrift portfolios and
re turn on net worth. In 1980, thrift portfolios had an average yield of 8 .8
percent and a marke t value that was much below the book value (Eichler 1989,
p. 44). The return on net worth fell to a record low of 2.4 percent in 1980,
compared to 15 percent in 1955, and 14.8 percent just two years b efore in 1978
(Eichler 1989, p. 41). This further illustrates the low yield on thrift portfolios .
In fact, if thrifts had changed the calculation to represent the current value of
assets and liabilities in 1980, the net worth would have been -$17 .5 billion
(Eic hler 1989, p. 44). At that time, the entire reserves of the Federal Savings
an d Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), a gove rnm e nt agency set up to
insure S&Ls, were just $6.5 billion-an ominous sign of the disaster to come
(Eichler 1989, pp. 40-44).
A major issue of the preside ntial elections of 1976 and 1980 was the d eregulation of thrifts. In the spring of 1980, President.Jimmy Carter and Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker started a program of credit restraints in order
to bring down the rate of inflation (Eichler 1989, p . 36). The plan succe eded
but was accompanied by a deep recession with a drastic effect on real estatea savings and loan stronghold (Barth 1991, p. 40). This poor economic
environment contributed to the restructuring and deregulation of S&Ls in a
period from late 1980 to 1982.
25
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Period of Deregulation. In the early 1980s , many reasons were given for the
deregulation of th e savings a nd loan industry. According to Eichler, the most
important were:
• A maturity misma tch between assets an d liabi lities;
• Inc reased competiti on for savings from money m arket funds;
• A "savers revolu tio n "-more money to be invested a nd more concern
regarding what to invest it in;
• Advancing technology, especially e le ctronically transferred funds,
which brou g ht into question th e usefuln e ss of large d e positor y
branches in which savings a nd loans had invested heavily;
• Altered demographics which pointe d to th e poten tial for a decrease
in housing demand ;
• Increasing popular acceptance of the idea that n a tional policy had
overly favored housing; and
• Mortgage banke rs b ecoming highly competitive as they could successfully operate without deposit insurance . ( 1989, pp. 5 7-5 8)
In 1980, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DID MCA) , the major d eregulation act for savings and
loans. According to Eichler, its four main reforms included:
• a program to phase out the deposit rate ceiling (Regulation Q) to
allow savings and loans to offer market rates;
• NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts for non-profit corporations and individuals;
• credit card lending and trust functions for federal savings and loans;
and
• authorization of federally chartered S&Ls to grant consumer loans
and commercial real estate loans, and to invest in commercial p a per
(notes payables) and debt securities up to 20 percent of assets. (1989,

p. 64)
Basically, DID MCA let S&Ls compete more easily for funds than previously
by allowing attractive interest rates and p e rmitting S&Ls a wider range of investment opportunities, such as stock portfolios, bonds, money market funds
and commercial real estate ventures.
Further deregulation, such as the Garn -St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, extended thrift opportunities for investment even more. The
maximum percentage of assets allowed in commercial real estate loans was
doubled to comprise 40 percent of assets (Eichler 1989, p. 122).
Hindsight allows us to question the need for such deregulation. First a nd
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fore most, there were already plenty of commercial banks. Unde r deregul atio n , savings and loans basi cally offer ed the same ser vices as comm e r cia l banks,
and the m a rket was alread y satur ated . Ano ther poor move was allowing S&Ls
to invest up to 3 p e rc e nt of their asse ts in "service companies " (Eichler 1989,
p. 65). These service companies undertook projects from which S&Ls were
barre d , usuall y risky real estate proj ects (Eichler 1989, p . 65). However, th e
mos t dangerous of a ll the DIDMCA reforms was the a uthorization of commercial real es tate loans and commercial mortgages-both of which are high
risk (Eic hler 1989, p. 65). Banks and insurance companies were already handli ng th ese loans and mortgages efficiently and aggressively. As a result, the
savings and loans got the loan requests that had been turned down by the other
financ ial institutions. Their inexperience h e lped create the impending fiasco.
As will be shown shortly, the DIDMCA reforms created an atmosphere that
would lend itself to risk taking and quick-fixes.
THE FA IL URE OF THE THR I FTS

"Blank check." The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation should
h ave been very c h oosy in awarding savings and loan charters (Eichler 1989, p.
65). However, real estate developers , syndicators, mortgage bankers, and entrepreneurs, a ll inexperienced in the ways of savings and loans, started S&Ls
in states with opportunity for rapid growth and few regu latio n s (Eichler 1989,
p. 65). The FSLIC approved almost all of the charters. The risks were high for
the new S&Ls, but the incredible leverage for investment justified it. A charter cou ld be had for as little as $1 million; therefo re, this was th e maximum
investors could lose. The remainder of the debt would fall on the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Treasury, or depositors. In effect , new savings and loans were given a "blank check." The FSLIC was willing
to allow S&Ls to sell U.S. Treasury debt through insured savings accounts, at
whatever price and under any terms they chose, using the proceeds to make
high risk loans (Eichler 1989, p. 76). They cou ld even buy property for development or invest in the securities markets.
Most impo rtantly, the investors had no personal li abi lity. The on ly restraint was a requirement to maintain 3 percent net worth (relative to
assets) -which could be created through questionable accounting practices
(Eichler 1989, p . 76).
As the powers of savings and loans increased, the economy b egan to recover
and interest rates began to fall , causing charters to become even more attrac27
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tive (Eic h le r 1989, p. 75 ). Manage r s could take high risks with th e chan ce fo r
b ig profits . This was e sp ecially attractive to aili n g th r ifts. T h ey wo u ld receive
a ny gain s a n d th e gove rnm e nt wo u ld b e ar a n y losse s (E ic hle r 1989, p . 80) .
Troubl e d savings and loan s n eed ed to ge n e rate su bstan tial profits to survive,
a nd th ey had access to unlimited fund s with whic h to d o it.

Commercial loa ns. With th e c r eatio n of th e D e p osi tor y I nsti tut ions Deregulation and Mon e ta r y Con trol Act in 1980 , co mme rcial le nding (whic h is
more risky than othe r forms of le nding du e to its inh eren t ri skin ess a nd lac k
of collate ral ) incre as ed greatly. U nfortunate ly, this risky le nding did not show
up on th e books. The a ppear a nce of losses lagged . Only a borrowe r 's failu re
to fini sh a project and complete a sal e at a profit r e quire d an organiza tion to
write a negative result in th e records . Thrift managers also often delayed reporting negative re sults (Eichler 1989, p. 99) .
These bad commercial loans were geographically concentrated in Texas,
Florida, and California because these states had the most growth. Texas' bad
economy reve aled an S&L investme nt histor y that was terrible eve n in good
times (Eichle r 1989, p. 100).
Some S&Ls, especially in California, created "disguised loans." According
to Eichle r, they would lend not only deve lopme nt costs, but also enough extra
funds to cove r interest payments and fe es for several years. This created a "selffulfilling prophecy" whe n S&Ls booked the interest and fees as current profit
(1989 , p. 96).

More risk taking. As th e risk taking continued, savings and loans that had
made poor choices found themselves short of the net worth ratio of 3 perce nt
or more (Eichler 1989 , p . 79). Creative accounting could not hide these
losses. Loans from the Home Loan Banks (lenders oflow cost funds to S&Ls)
and the FSLIC needed to be repaid before earnings could b e used to raise net
worth ra tios (Eichler 1989, p. 79). Management had to continue to push for
high-growth through more high risks . In a December 1982 speech to S&L
executives, David Pratt, Chairman of th e Bank Board, eve n encouraged such
imprude nt practices:
One a pproach would be to start 10 or 15 thrift ins titutions or co mm e r cial banks and e ngage in th e most risky activi ties legally allowed. If
you believe that re turn is related to risks, the expected value of your return s
would be higher tha n under any other approach , while at the sam e tim e ,
yo u could buy your funds on a risk-free basis through offering U . S.
Gove rnment obliga tions in the form of insured savings accounts. Th a t
is a scenario that we, as regulators, and that you, as managem e nt, are going
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to have to oper ate u n de r becau se that o pportuni ty is a realistic on e. (Eichle r

1989, p. 80)

Man y S&L m anage rs to ok P ratt 's words to he art. David Paul, Centr u st
Chairman of Miami , invested Centrust's assets heavily in junk bonds. By the late
1980s, Ce ntrustwas the most profitable thrift in th e region . However, the
mar ke t value of junk bonds fe ll a nd Ce ntrust we nt with it. A senior official of
th e Office of Thrift Supe rvision (OTS) stated that losses attributable to fraud
are in the 25 percent range (Barth 1991 , p. 44).
Effect of economic recovery. After 1982, residential construction bounce d back.
Acco rd ing to Eichler, vacancies and surpluses replaced shortages, and conside rab le mortgage mon ey was available. The problem for thrifts was a lack of
sound investments ( due to competition from commercial banks), not a lack of
fun ds (1989, p . 119) .
Ehrlich states that sharply lower interest rates on deposits had a positive
effect on thrifts in the mid- l 980s. The spread between the cost of S&L funds
and the yield on their portfolios widened. Many savings and loans decided to
go public in order to gain more capital for growth . Because oflow intere st rate s,
these stocks looked relatively attractive ( 1985, p . 64).
The recove ry basically just delayed the failure of many thrifts until the late
1980s, when recession would again be prominent. For others, failure was already evident.
Role of the FSLIC. Many institutions were still in trouble , however, due to
offering submarket rates on low-quality loans. The Federal Savings and Loan
Insura nce Corporation did not want to liquidate these insolvent S&Ls because
their net worth was so low and it had no funds to pay for the cost of liquidating them. Instead of asking Congress for the money, the FSLIC hoped that a
bette r economic environment and careful use of new powers by thrifts would
cause enough of them to recover to make the number manageable (Eichler
1989, p. 78). Therefore, savings and loans with negative or ze ro n e t worth were
allowed to operate. This created an open-ended commitment by the gove rnment to protect depositors.
Th e FSLIC created "phoenixes" - large institutions in metropolitan areas in
which smaller firms could combine. The FSLIC would be responsible for installing th e board of directors. The FSLIC then sold these phoenixes to commercial
banks or outside corporations which were not permitted to operate in those areas
permitted the S&Ls. From 1983 to 1985, the FSLIC liquidated 25 associations,
assisted 160 mergers, placed 25 institutions under new management, supervised
256 merge rs and approved 542 voluntary mergers (Eichler 1989, p. 101).
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Failure of the FSLIC. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
operates similarly to any insurance company. Premiums are paid by the
member savings and Joans, and these funds are used to pay for any claims. The
toll on the FSLIC was costly, however. According to the Bank Board, the FSLIC
had a net income of$494,000 in 1985 and a net loss of$3.9 billion in 1986
(Eichler 1989, p. 101). The FSLIC was broke. The claims on its funds far outweighed its premiums.
In 1987, Congress approved a plan for 12 Home Loan Banks to raise $10.8
billion for the FSLIC to spend in the course of 3 years (Eichler 1989, p. 103).
The Home Loan Banks would have a claim against future FSLIC premiums until
the Joan was paid. After 1987, the FSLIC's role was greatly diminished as new
organizations were organized to deal more effectively with the fiasco. In 1989,
the Savings Association Insurance Fund replaced the FSLIC. The FSLIC
Resolution Fund was established to assume all liabilities associated with failed
savings and loans prior to January 1989. The Resolution Trust Corporation,
which will be discussed shortly, was established to deal with all future liabilities.
Bank Board mistakes. In the early 1980s, the Bank Board should have put a
moratorium on the number of new charters the FSLIC could grant. Although
the total number of S&Ls did not actually increase, the FSLIC did not have the
supervisory or financial resources to deal appropriately with the great number of new S&Ls. The Bank Board should have created more stringent
accounting rules-tougher than Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP)-in order to prevent the hiding of losses. The Bank Board should also
have conditioned both growth and riskier investment on higher net worth
ratios (Eichler 1989, p. 123). Savings and loans were allowed to increase debt
for a shot at higher profits. The Bank Board could also have pushed for a
change to equity (shares of stock that inherently need not be paid back) by
S&Ls. This would have eased the potential burden on the insurance fundsmostly the FSLIC (Ehrlich 1985, p. 64). The FSLIC and other insurance funds
would then have had the ability to raise capital.
THE CLEANUP EFFORT

The Resolution Trust Corporation. In August 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). FIRREA
created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and Congress named William Seidman, then current head of FDIC, as its director. This agency was
formed to supervise the savings and loan bailout. Congress, at President Bush's
DRAFTINGS IN ECONOMICS
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insiste nce , split the rescue effort between two groups. The Resolution Trust
Corporation Oversight Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
( FDIC) both supervise and control the RTC. The Oversight Board, chaired by
th e U .S. Treasury Secretary, decides RTC policy and controls its funding . The
Treasury was given a role so that the Administration would have a hand in the
effort (Gorman 1990, p . 58) . In 1990, the RTC had 5,000 employees and 20
offices nationwide (Yang 1990, p. 66).
In its first year, the RTC took over 264sick thrifts (Meehan 1989, p . 76) .
After a slow start, the RTC had by 1990, been effective in disposing of more
than 340 insolvent thrifts seized by the government, receiving $110billion for
the assets (Yang 1990, p. 66) . New tougher capital standards in recent bailout
legislation may make it difficult for even marginally profitable thrifts to survive (Meehan 1989, p. 76). This will make the RTC task even more difficult.
Slowing of economy and thrift rescue. By 1990 the economy was in a recession
and buyer interest in sick savings and loans was, according to Karmin, practically nonexistent (1990, p. 37). Unfortunately, federal managers misjudged
th e market when they tried to sell the worst S&Ls first and required pur-

chasers to buy whole S&Ls - money-losing properties included . In 1990,
rising interest rates increased the cost to buyers and the savings and loan industry grew even more sickly. More failures occurred (Karmin 1990, p. 3 7).
Even after loans were bringing in money again or properties were revitalized,
the asset managers could still barely move them because of stiff competition
from commercial banks and other firms trying to sell their own bad assets
(Dentzer 1990, p . 40).
The RTC's effort to sell several hundred billion dollars worth of real estate
lingered over the market, depressing prices and damaging the loan portfolios
of the surviving 2,600 S&Ls in 1990 (Gorman 1990, p. 58). Slow disposal of real
estate could push the cost of the bailout to more than $500 billion over 30
years (Gorman 1990, p. 58). The RTC's slow start is estimated to be costing the
U.S. $ 14 million per day in operating losses and various other expenses. The
total number of S & Ls to be bailed out could progress to 1,000 , which is twice
the number expected in President Bush's original plan (Gorman 1990, p. 58).
The real estate effort. In 1988, the RTC had considerable success in selling off
th e real estate of the defunct thrifts. The RTC offered huge tax breaks and
profit guarantees to those willing to purchase ailing institutions (Yang 1990, p.
67). It became a great giveaway by the government with some business people
getting outrageous deals. In December 1988, for example, Ronald 0.
Perele man, a private investor, received $900 million in tax benefits when he
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purchase d fiv e insolvent Texas thrifts (Meeh an 1989, p. 76) .
In response to th e se incre dibl e deals , Congre ss passed n ew legisla tion requiring that thrift properties be sold for a t le ast 95 p e rce nt of th e ir assessed
market value (Drummond 1989, p. 212). This alone gre atly slowed the bailout effort. Pote ntial buyers could find better deals elsewhere (Gorman 1990,
p. 59). Red tape was also involved in the selling of assets. According to
Drummond, two appraisals were re quired, and in big metropolita n areas this
could take months. Local housing agencies also had the right of r efusal if they
did not like the deal. Analysis by these agencies could take three to four months
in most places (1989, p. 212).
Real estate experts said the legislation was over cautious and d e signed only
to prevent the appearance of a great giveaway (Gorman 1990, p. 58). Forbes
magazine found it took two months for the RTC to respond to offers-despite cash in h and (Drummond 1989, p. 212). In 1989, the government disposed
of only $ 2.8 million worth of real estate a day nationwide. At that rate it would
take 140 years to sell $ 100 billion worth (Drummond 1989, p . 212). As of 1990,
the RTC owne d 26,800 home s, 773 office buildings, 158 hotels, 205 resorts, 5 1
restaurants, 236 industrial facilities, and 43 mines (Gorman 1990, p. 58).
Many of these assets have been neglected over the past five years; however,
the RTC refuses to fix up any of th e properties or to provide loans to pote ntial
buyers (Gorman 1990, p . 59) . The RTC is attempting to liquidate assets and
would prefer not to spend additional money on maintenance. To move this
tremendous amount ofreal estate, outside help is going to be needed (Meehan
1989 , p. 76) . Involving the private sector will more than like ly increase the
efficiency of the disposals by decreasing the red tape.
A major problem for the savings and loan bailout, however, is that commercial banks are not buying th e S&Ls (Karmin 1990, p . 38) . Bank examin e rs
watch these risky investments closely. Also, banks ar e also incre asing their own
capita! r e quire ments by selling the same typ e s of assets - bran ch d e positories
and loans (Yang 1990, p. 67). According to Yang , because of th e se capital
requirements, banks ar e even le ss like ly than before to finan ce risky real estate
loans that could help the thrift effort. Bank r e gulators a r e worried about
insolvencies and are discouraging real esta te loans (1990 , pp . 66-67).
THE F U T U R E OF TH E BAILO UT EFF OR T

New efforts. Knowing that it would need to change to become m o r e effective,
the RTC began working wi th Congre ss in 1990 to create n ew policies. Most of
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th e p o licies deal with ove rcoming buyer resistance to purchasing real estate of
th e faile d thrifts. Policies from the summer of 1990 allocated $ 7 billion for the
RTC to finance 85 percent of the value of properties being sold (Yang 1990, p.
67) . In effect, this is a loan from the RTC with a mandatory down payment
require d from investors. The RTC benefits from the 15 percent down payme n t and 10-11 percent interest payments while, at the same tim e, losing liability
for taxes and overhead expenses associated with maintaining the properties
(Yang 1990, p. 67) . This is a positive step as buyers can now more easily obtain
loans. Commercial banks, however, are still reluctant to lend money.
In April 1992 the Senate passed a bill providing the RTC with a $25 billion
budget plus an additional $17 billion, to be spent without a deadline; it would
also allocate $ 1.85 billion to the Office of Thrift Supervision (Thomas 1992,
P· A5). A similar bill supported by President Bush was vetoed by the House of
Represe ntatives. Bush's bill was controversial because it tried to help thrifts
before they became insolvent (Thomas 1992, p . C9). Therefore shareholders,
in addition to depositors, would benefit. Previously, all monetary support was
justified on the basis that it protected only depositors. Both bills suggest that
it may be less expensive to help ailing thrifts before they fail.
Another positive step is selling "clean thrifts." This involves retaining the
bad real estate and securities Uunk bonds, for example) and only selling the
promising assets (Karmin 1990, p. 38). This should have the effect of reducin g the risk for investors involved in reviving an S&L.
The RTC has invoked a bailout mandate: to finish taking over all insolvent
S&Ls by September 1993 and to exit the real estate business by 1996 (Karmin
1990, p. 38). This may be next to impossible, but the RTC is trying hard to succeed . To quicken the pace, the RTC is enlisting the help of outside experts: asset
m anage rs, accounting firms , lawyers, banks, insurance companies, real estate
experts, and investment bankers. All combined may earn a total of up to $50
billion for their services (Dentzer 1990, p. 39). By involving the private sector, the
RTC is not only enlisting much needed help, but also reducing future costs by
improving efficiency through expertise. To attract workout specialists, who attempt to make bad investments profitable, the RTC is offe ring big discounts on
groups of poor loans and bad real estate (Yang 1990, p. 67). According to Dentzer,
th ese independent specialists and firms may be able to get 30 to 50 percent of
book value for the undesirable assets. lfleft alone, these assets have the potential
to lose up to 20 percent of their value for every year left unattended (1990, p. 40).
The RTC is also attempting to group together commercial real estate loans.
The agency is offering $528 million in loans on small office buildings and shops
33
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in th e form of securiti e s (T homas 1992, p . Cl). A r e se rve fund (in case of
default) of $150 million was established in order to h ave th e offering rated
triple-A (Thomas 1992, p . Cll). The advantage of these offerings is that the
RTC can quickly liquidate assets and limit its risk. The re serve fund is use d only
if a loan defaults, and the government is limited to losses equal to the reserve
amount (Thomas 1992, p. Cll). These securities-type offerings may be used
more in the future.
Likely future efforts. The dilemma for the RTC and other regulatory agencies is the amount of regulation that should be invoked in the bailout. They
must regulate enough to avoid abuses of the system , but not so much as to slow

the efforts (Dentzer 1990, p. 39). The Oversight Board wants to control the
structure, but the RTC needs its freedom to expedite the bailout effort.
If the RTC is to sell assets quickly it must enlist the help of private firms and
individuals. This should become more prevalent in the future as encouraging
steps have already been taken. Although most of the focus of the S&L crisis is

on real estate assets, these assets comprise only $17 billion of the $190 billion
in total assets of the insolvent S&Ls as of 1990 (Dentzer 1990, p. 39) . Dentzer
states that $ 110 billion of the rest is in loans of some form or another ( 1990,
p. 39). They range from credit card receivables to commercial mortgages with
real estate pledged as collateral. If the RTC is to succeed, sorting out these loans
and then selling them will be vital (Dentzer 1990, p. 39). The success of the S&L
bailout hinges on the bad loans.
Presently, the Treasury is advocating a new proposal involving financial
institutions. Among other things, it would toughen bank supervision , consolidate regulatory agencies, and recapitalize the FDIC (Economist 1991 , p . 75) .
Clearly, the trend seems to be away from deregulation and back towards stricter
regulations. The lessons of history may be remembered. However, Congress'
readiness to spread blame for the scandal may affect the long-term r eforms
proposed by former Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady that could help to
prevent a future bank disaster (Economist 1991, p. 75).
Costs. The thrift disaster will cost Americans $500 billion over th e n e xt 30
years (Economist 1991, p. 75). It is the taxpayer who will be burdened with the
huge bill. Appropriately, however, it is the taxpayer as depositor that will benefit. The majority of the funds are being used to pay for claims that depositors
have against failed savings and loans. The money helps to restore public faith

in the S&L industry. According to Karmin, originally savings and loans and
commercial banks were required to pay one-third of the rescue expense
through higher premiums on federal insurance. Unfortunately, insurance
DRAFTI N GS I N E CON OMI CS
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premiu ms are directly related to th e number a nd size o f de p osits, and thrift
deposits have not been growing ( 1990, p. 37 ). Dentzer states th a t th e bailout
tab is now estimate d at $ 250 billion or over $ 1,000 for every American ( 1990 ,
P· 39) . If the $500 billion estimate is correct , it works o ut to $ 2,000 per perso n. In 1990, various present value methods , which use tomorrow ' s dollars and
discou nt them back to their present day worth, estimated ranges from a low of
$75 b illion to a high of at least $ 140 billion to liquidate the r e maining failed
s&Ls (Barth 1991 , p. 77) . Even these estimates may prove to be conservative .
In 1990 , the RTC expected an additional 223 bad S&Ls to fail with $186 billion
in asse ts (Yang 1990, p. 66). As of the end of 1990, the RTC had disposed of 373
fail ed thrifts and sold almost one-half of the $274 billion in assets that came
with them (Economist 1991, p. 75) .
Substantial losses occur every day. For example, Charles Keating's Lincoln
Savin gs and Loan had assets of$5 billion but could be sold for only $12 million,
a loss to the government and taxpayer of $ 2 .6 billion (Econom ist 1991, p. 7 5).
T h ese incredible numbe rs require that the RTC have incredible funding.
Som e lawmakers suggest linking the funding to the success in liquidating assets, bu t th e RTC needs money in order to liquidate assets (Yang 1990, p. 67) .
Lawmakers are reluctant to risk their political futures for adequate, albeit
high ly controversial, funding. If the RTC is to do its job, it is going to have to
be fully funded. On a positive note, Office of Thrift Supervision director
Tim othy Ryan recently reported that the thrift industry will show a "significant
profit" for 1991, the first such year since 1986 (Thomas 199 2, p . Cll).
Fu ture Prevention Measures. A repetition of the e vents of the 1980s and the

resulting savings and loan disaster can be prevented. Savings and loans must
return to the service that was originally unique to them -

that of the home

lende r. Savings and Loans could create a strong market niche again by striving to fulfill this need.
To ugher regulation of the S&L indus t ry is also necessary. Increased capital requirements, for instance, are certainly justifi e d. An increase in capital
requ ire ments would force savings and loan managers to use their own funds
instea d of taxpayers ' and would eliminate the "blank check" by limiting the
leverage available to them.
Many of the problems facing th e savings and loan industry 12 years ago , are
now reappearing in th e banking industry. Banks, and their regulators, will need
to be careful not to repeat past mistakes made by their sister industry. The banking
indus tr y is larger and more influential than the savings and loan industry, and
a simila r occurrence would have a much greater effect on the nation.
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CONCLUSION

Although the Resolution Trust Corporation's early efforts were often controversial and ineffectual, more recent actions suggest greater success. Savings
and loans showed their first profit since 1986. Current RTC President Albert
V. Casey stated in March 1992 that operations are beginning to come to an end.

"The vast majority of thrift institutions to be resolved is behind us and the
backlog of assets to be sold is declining, indicating now is the time to start
downsizing the RTC " (RTC Review 1992, p. 7). In the near future, new regulations must be created to deal with accountability issues . History must be
remembered . The savings and loan debacle could have been prevented. The
deregulation efforts of the early 1980s were not necessarily at fault. Ironically,
poor regulation of the new powers granted to S&Ls through deregulation is
mostly to blame . It was the abuse of the new privileges, both in financial and
ethical terms, that created the disaster.
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